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Abstract
The design of equilibrium protocols in sender-receiver games where com-
munication is noisy occupies an important place in the Economic literature.
This paper shows that the common way of constructing a noisy channel com-
munication protocol in Information Theory does not necessarily lead to a Nash
equilibrium. Given the decoding scheme, it may happen that, given some state,
it is better for the sender to transmit a message that is di erent from that
prescribed by the codebook. Similarly, when the sender uses the codebook as
prescribed, the receiver may sometimes prefer to deviate from the decoding
scheme when receiving a message.
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11 Introduction
A central result of Information Theory is Shannon’s noisy channel coding theorem.
The purpose of this note is to point out that this theorem is not robust to a game
theoretical analysis and thus cannot be directly applied to strategic situations. To
demonstrate our inquiry we study the same framework as Shannon: the possibility
of a noisy channel communication between a privately informed sender and a re-
ceiver who must take an action. Our contribution is to show that the methodology
developed for optimal information transmission do not necessarily deﬁne equilibria
of sender-receiver games.
The issue of information transmission is not new in Economics and actually
there is a vast literature starting with the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel
[3]. Several papers have additionally addressed the situation where communication
may be distorted in the communication process by assuming that messages may
not arrive (Myerson [12], Rubinstein [13], among others). This brand of literature
points out that players’ strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge” is
not enough to guarantee coordination. Less research has been undertaken when the
noisy communication is of a particular type: while messages are always received
by the receiver, they may di er from those sent by the sender (Blume et al. [1],
Koessler [10], Hern´ andez et al. [9], Mitusch and Strausz [11]). Another brand of the
literature deals with entropy based communication protocols (See Gossner et al [4],
Gossner and Tomala [5], [6], [7], Hern´ andez and Urbano [8]).
Traditional Information Theory, pioneered by Shannon [14], has approached
noisy information transmission by considering that agents communicate through
a discrete noisy channel. Although Shannon does not describe this situation as
a game, we consider it as in a standard sender-receiver game with two players: a
sender and a receiver. The sender has to communicate through a noisy channel some
private information from a message source to the receiver, who must take some ac-
tion from an action space, and with both receiving 1 if the information is correctly
transmitted and 0 otherwise. More precisely, suppose the sender wishes to transmit
an input sequence of signals (a message) through a channel that makes errors. One
way to compensate for these errors is to send through the channel not the sequence
itself but a modiﬁed version of the sequence that contains redundant information.
The process of modiﬁcation chosen is called the encoding of the message. The re-
ceiver receives an output message and he has to decode it, removing the errors and
obtaining the original message. He does this by applying a decoding function.
The situation that we consider, in line with the set up of Information Theory,
is as follows. We have a set   of M states. The sender wants to transmit through
the channel the chosen state, so there are M possible messages. The communication
protocol is chosen, given by a codebook of M possible messages, each of which is
represented by a codeword of length n over the communication alphabet. The sender
2picks the codeword corresponding to the state. This codeword is transmitted and
altered by the noisy channel. The receiver decodes the received message (a string of
n symbols from the alphabet), according to some decoding scheme. The protocol is
common knowledge to the players. Both sender and receiver are supposed to follow
the rules of the protocol.
The natural question from the viewpoint of Game Theory is whether following
the rules constitutes a Nash equilibrium. The protocol may not deﬁne the best
possible code in terms of reliability, but in that case one may hope that it constitutes
at least a not-so-good Nash equilibrium.
This paper shows that the common way of constructing a communication proto-
col does not necessarily lead to a Nash equilibrium: Given the decoding scheme, it
may happen that, given some state, it is better for the sender to transmit a message
that is di erent from that prescribed by the codebook. Similarly, when the sender
uses the codebook as prescribed, the receiver may sometimes prefer to deviate from
the decoding scheme when receiving a message.
This common way of choosing a communication protocol is as follows:
1. The channel with its errors is deﬁned as a discrete Markov process where a
symbol from the alphabet is transformed into some other symbol according to some
error probability.
2. From these characteristics of the channel one can compute a capacity of the
channel, which determines the maximal rate of transmitting information reliably.
For example, a rate of 0.2 means that (if the alphabet is binary) for every bit of
information on the input side, one needs to transmit 5 bits across the channel.
3. A main insight of Shannon is that as long as the rate is below channel capacity,
the probability of error in information transmission can be made arbitrarily small
when the length n of the codewords is allowed to be su ciently long.
The way Shannon achieves the above is the following: The sender selects M
codewords of length n at random. That is, for every input message, the encoding is
chosen entirely randomly from the set of all possible encoding functions. Further-
more, for every message, this choice is independent of the encoding of every other
message. With high probability this random choice leads to a “nearly optimal” en-
coding function, from the point of view of rate and reliability. The decoding rule
is based on a simple idea: A channel outcome will be decoded as a speciﬁc input
message if that input sequence is “statistically close” to the output sequence. This
statistical proximity is measured in terms of the entropy of the joint distribution of
both sequences which establishes when two sequences are probabilistically related.
The associated decoding function is known as the jointly typical decoding.
Our methodological note is organized as follows. The sender-receiver game and
the noisy channel are set up in Section 2. Section 3 o ers a rigorous presentation
of Shannon’s communication protocol, specifying players’ strategies from a theoret-
3ical viewpoint. The reader familiar with Information Theory can skip it. Section 4
presents three simple examples of a sender-receiver game with speciﬁc code realiza-
tions. The ﬁrst two examples o er the following code realizations: 1) the “natural
one” where the decoding rule translates to the majority rule and where the equilib-
rium conditions are satisﬁed; and 2) a worse code realization, where a deviation by
the receiver takes place. The last example exhibits a sender’s deviation. Concluding
remarks close the paper.
2 The basic sender-receiver set up
Consider the possibilities of communication between two players, called the sender
(S) and the receiver (R) in an incomplete information game  : there is a ﬁnite set of
feasible states of nature   = { 0,..., M 1}. Nature chooses ﬁrst randomly  j    
with probability qj and then the sender is informed of this state  j, the receiver
must take some action in some ﬁnite action space A, and payo s are realized. The
agents’ payo s depend on the sender’s information or type   and the receiver’s
action a. Let u : A     R be the players’ (common) payo  function, i.e., u(at, j),
j =0 ,1,...,M   1. Assume that for each realization of  , there exists a unique
receiver’s action with positive payo s: for each state  j    , there exists a unique
action   aj   A such that:
u(at, j)=
 
1 if at =   aj
0 otherwise
The timing of the game is as follows: the sender observes the value of   and then
sends a message, which is a string of signals from some message space. It is assumed
that signals belong to some ﬁnite space and may be distorted in the communication
process. This distortion or interference is known as noise. The noise can be modeled
by assuming that the signals of each message can randomly be mapped to the whole
set of possible signals. An unifying approach to this noisy information transmission
is to consider that agents communicate through a discrete noisy channel.
Deﬁnition 1 A discrete channel (X;p(y|x);Y ) is a system consisting of an input
alphabet X and output alphabet Y , and a probability transition matrix p(y|x) that
expresses the probability of observing the output symbol y, given that the symbol x
was sent.
A channel is memoryless if the probability distribution of the output depends only
on the input at that time and is conditionally independent of previous channel inputs
or outputs. In addition, a channel is used without feedback if the input symbols do
not depend on the past output symbols.
The nth extension of a discrete memoryless channel is the channel (X = Xn;p(y =




4Consider the binary channel  ( 0, 1) = (X = {0,1};p(y|x);Y = {0,1}) where
p(1|0) =  0 and p(0|1) =  1 (i.e.,  l is the probability of a mistransmission of input
message l) and let  n( 0, 1) be its nth extension. While binary channels may seem
rather oversimpliﬁed, they capture the essence of most mathematical challenges
that arise when trying to make communication reliable. Furthermore, many of the
solutions found to make communication reliable in this setting have been generalized
to other scenarios.
Let  n
  denote the extended communication game. It is a one-stage game where
the sender sends a message x   X of length n, using the noisy channel, the receiver
observes a realization y   Y of such a message and takes an action in  .
A strategy of S in the extended communication game  n
  is a decision rule sug-
gesting the message to be sent at each  j:aM-tuple { S
j }j where  S
j   X is the






y, specifying an action choice in   as a response to the realized output
sequence y   Y.
Expected payo s are deﬁned in the usual way. Let the tuple of the sender’s
payo s be denoted by { S







y)}j, where for each  j,
 S













and where p(y| S
j ) is the sender’s probability about the realization of the output
sequence y   Y conditional on having sent message  S
j in state  j.
Let the tuple of the receiver’s payo s be denoted by { R




where for each output sequence y   Y,
 R









and where p( S
j |y) is the receiver’s probability about input message  S
j in state  j
conditional on having received the output message y.
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the communication game is a pair of tuples
({   S
j }j,{   R
y}y) such that for each  j, and for any other strategy    S
j of the sender,
   S
j =  S
j (   S
j ,{   R
y}y)    S
j (   S
j ,{   R
y}y)
and for each y   Y and for any other receiver’s strategy    R
y,
   R
y =  R
y({   S
j }j,   R
y)    R
y({   S
j }j,   R
y)
5Notice that the set of probabilities {p( S






p(y) ) is always well-deﬁned (p(y) > 0 for all y). Therefore, the
Nash equilibrium is also a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Fix the Sender’s strategy { S
j }0,...,M 1 where  S
j   X is the message sent by S
given that the true state of nature is  j. The receiver has to take an action al in  
after receiving an output sequence y such that:
al = Arg max
al










Equivalently, given the linearity of the receiver’s payo  functions in probabilities
{p( S





















then the receiver will choose, for each y, action al whenever qlp( S






k |y)   1), for all k  = l, k =0 ,...,M   1, and will choose ak otherwise.
This condition translates to the receiver choosing action al whenever qlp(y| S
l )  
qkp(y| S
k), and choosing ak otherwise, with p(y| S
j ) given by the channel’s error
probabilities and by the sender’s coding. To simplify assume that the states of
nature are uniformly distributed, ql = 1
M for l  {0,...,M   1}. Then
 R
y = al, whenever p(y| S
l )   p(y| S
k)   S
k   X (1)
Consider now the sender’s best response to the receiver’s strategy  R
y. The
sender’s problem is to choose an input sequence  S
j for each state  j, j =0 ,...,M  
1, such that
 S










Given the receiver’s decoding, the above problem amounts to choosing an input
sequence  S








for any other input sequences xS in all codebooks over {0,1}n.
63 Shannon’s communication protocol
For completeness we present ﬁrst some basic results from Information Theory, largely
following Cover and Thomas [2]
Let X be a random variable with probability distribution p. The entropy H(X)
of X is deﬁned by H(X)=     p( )log(p( )= EX [logp(X)], where 0 log
0 = 0 by convention. Consider independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables X1,...,Xn. Then by the deﬁnition of entropy,
H(X1,...,Xn)=   1  1 ...  n  np( 1,..., n)logp( 1,..., n)
where p( 1,..., n)=p(X1 =  1,...,Xn =  n).
Let x be a sequence of length n over a ﬁnite alphabet   of size | |. Denote by
 i(x) the frequency  i over n. We deﬁne the empirical entropy of x, denoted by
H( 1(x),..., | |(x)), as the entropy of the empirical distribution of x.
An (M,n) code for the channel (X,p(y | x),Y) consists of 1) an index set
{0,1,...,M   1}; 2) an encoding function e : {0,1,...,M   1}    Xn, yield-
ing codewords: e(1),e(2),...,e(M). The set of codewords is called the codebook; 3)
a decoding function d : Y n    {0,1,...,M   1}.
Consider a noisy channel and a communication length n. Let
 i = Pr(d(Y n  = i|Xn = Xn(i)) =
 
yn
p(yn|xn(i))I(d(yn)  = i)
be the conditional probability of error given that index i was sent, and where I(.) is
the indicator function. The maximal probability of error  (n) for an (M,n) code is
deﬁned as  (n) = maxi {0,1,...,M 1}  i and the average probability of error P
(n)
e for




M 1  
i=0
 i. Note that P
(n)
e    (n).
The rate and the mutual information are two useful concepts from Information
Theory characterizing when information can be reliably transmitted over a commu-
nications channel. The rate r of an (M,n) code is equal to r =
log| | M
n , and a rate
r is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (2nr,n) codes such that the
maximal probability of error  (n) tends to 0 as n goes to  . The capacity of a
discrete memoryless channel is the supremum of all achievable rates.
The mutual information I(X;Y ) measures the information that random variables
X and Y share. Mutual information can be equivalently expressed as I(X;Y )=
H(X)   H(X|Y )=H(Y )   H(Y |X), where H(Y |X) is the conditional entropy of
Y (taking values  2    2) given X (taking values  1    1) deﬁned by
H(Y | X)= 
 
 1  1
p( 1)
 
 2  2
p( 2 |  1)logp( 2 |  1).
7Then, the capacity C of a channel can be expressed as the maximum of the
mutual information. Formally: C = suppX I(X;Y ) between the input and output
of the channel, where the maximization is with respect to the input distribution.
Therefore the channel capacity is the tightest upper bound on the amount of infor-
mation that can be reliably transmitted over a communications channel.
Theorem 1 (Shannon):All rates below capacity C are achievable. Speciﬁcally, for
every rate r < C, there exists a sequence of (2nr,n) codes with maximum probability
of error  (n)    0. Conversely, any sequence of (2nr,n) codes with  (n)    0 must
have r   C.
3.1 Shannon’s strategies:
Fix a channel and a communication length n. We can compute from the channel
its capacity C, and from n the information transmission rate r. Shannon’s theorem
states that given a noisy channel with capacity C and information transmission
rate r, if r < C, then there will exist both an encoding rule and a decoding rule
which will allow the receiver to make arbitrarily small the average probability of the
information transmission error. These two parameters: rate and capacity are the
key to the existence of such coding1.
The sender’s strategy: random coding Let us show how to construct a ran-
dom choice of codewords to generate a (M,n) code for our sender-receiver game.
Consider the binary channel  ( 0, 1) and its nth extension  n( 0, 1). Following
Shannon’s construction random codes are generated, for each state of nature, ac-
cording to the probability distribution   that maximizes the mutual information
I(X;Y ). In other words, let us assume a binary random variable X  that takes
value 0 with probability   and value 1 with probability 1    . Then, let Y  be the
random variable deﬁned by the probabilistic transformation of input variable X 
through the channel, with probability distribution:
Y  = {(1    0)  +  1(1    ), 0  + (1    1)(1    )}.
Therefore the mutual information between X  and Y  is equal to:
I(X ;Y )=H(Y )   H(Y |X )=
H({(1    0)  +  1(1    ), 0  + (1    1)(1    )})   [ H( 0) + (1    )H( 1)],
where   is obtained as the solution of the optimization problem:
  = argmax
 
I(X ,Y  )
1Notice that for a ﬁxed C, it is always possible to ﬁnd a length n, large enough, to guarantee
Shannon’s Theorem. Alternatively, given a ﬁxed r, we can always ﬁnd a noisy structure, a channel,
achieving this transmission rate.
8Denoting by p(x) the distribution of X  according to  , generate 2nR codewords,








x1(0) x2(0) ... xn(0)
... ... ... ...
x1(M   1) x2(M   1) ... xn(M   1)
 
 
and therefore the probability of such a code is: p( )=





The receiver’s strategy: jointly typical decoding The receiver’s strategy is
based on a statistical property derived from the weak law of large numbers. This
property tell us when two sequences are probabilistically related.
Deﬁnition 2 The set An
  of jointly typical sequences {x,y} with respect to the




{(x,y)   X   Y :
 
   1
n logp(x)   H(X)
 
  < ;
 
   1
n logp(y)   H(Y )
 
  <  and  
   1
n logp(x,y)   H(X,Y )
 
  < }
A channel outcome y   Y will be decoded as the ith index if the codeword
xi   X is “jointly typical” with the received sequence y: two sequences x and y are
jointly  -typical if the pair (x,y) is  -typical with respect to the joint distribution
p(x,y) and both x and y are  -typical with respect to their marginal distributions
p(x) and p(y). In words, a typical set with tolerance  , An
 , is the set of sequences
whose empirical entropy di er by no more than   from their true entropy.
Shannon’s communication protocol: Let us apply the above concepts to the
extended communication game  n
 . The sender communicates her private informa-
tion, through the nth extension of the noisy channel  ( 0, 1), by generating M
codewords of length n from the probability   which maximizes the capacity of the
channel. The communication protocol has the following sequence of events:
1. The realization of such codes is revealed to both the sender and the receiver.
2. The sender is informed about the true state of nature and sends message xi
associated to i    .
3. The receiver observes a sequence y, according to p(y|x)=
 n
i=1 p(yi|xi)
94. The receiver updates the possible state of nature, and decides that index l    
was sent if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
• (xl,y) are jointly typical.
• There is no other index k     such that (xk,y) are jointly typical.
• If no such l     exists, then an error will be declared.
5. Finally, the receiver chooses an action in   according to his decoding rule:
• if y is only jointly typical with xl, he takes action al,
• otherwise, no action is taken.
Shannon was the ﬁrst one to show that good codes exists. Given the above
strategies and Shannon’s Theorem, we can construct a good code for information
transmission purposes in the following way:
1. Choose ﬁrst the   that maximizes the mutual information I(X;Y ) and gen-
erate a realization of the random code. Then, for all   there exists an n  such that
for all n   n , the empirical entropy of each realized code is at distance
 
12 to H(X).
2. By the jointly typical decoding rule, any output message y is decoded as
either a unique input coding x, or an error is declared. When no error is declared,
the decoding rule translates to the condition that the distance between the empirical
entropy of the pair (x,y) and the true entropy H(X,Y ) is smaller than
 
12.
3. By the proof of the above Shannon’s Theorem (Cover and Thomas, page 200–
202), the average probability of error P
(n)
e , averaged over all codebooks, is smaller
than
 
2. Therefore, for a ﬁxed n   [n , ), there shall exist a realization of a codebook
satisfying that at least half of its codewords have conditional probability of error
less than  . In particular, its maximal probability of error  (n) is less than  .
Notice that in order to apply this protocol to a standard sender-receiver game,
one needs to deﬁne an assignment rule when an error is declared in Shannon’s pro-
tocol. This rule assigns an action to the decoding errors and allows us to completely
specify the receiver’s strategy.
Remark:
Shannon’s Theorem is an asymptotic result and establishes that for all    ap-
proximations there exists a large enough n guaranteeing a small average error related
to such  . By the proof of the Theorem (Cover and Thomas, page 200-202), the av-
erage error has two terms. The ﬁrst one comes from the Jointly Typical Set deﬁned
by such a threshold  . Here, again for large enough n, the probability that a realized
output sequence is not jointly typical with the right code is very low. The second
term comes from the declared errors in Shanon’s protocol, which have a probability
of 2{ n(I(X:Y ) 3 ))} of taking place and which is very small when n is large enough.
10Therefore, both probabilities are bigger or smaller depending on both n and how
many outcomes are rightly declared, and they are important to partition the output
sequence space.
When we focus on ﬁnite-time communication protocols, i.e., when n and   are
both ﬁxed, disregarding asymptotic assumptions, we cannot guarantee that the
above probabilities are small enough with respect to n. Actually, the  -approximation
and the corresponding di erent associated errors can generate di erent partitions of
the output space. Therefore, careful attention shall be paid to generate a partition
in such situations.
3.2 Nash Equilibrium Codes
We have deﬁned good information transmission codes. They come from asymptotic
behavior. Now, we look for ﬁnite communication-time codes and such that no player
has an incentive to deviate.
Let Yl be the set of y’s in Y such that the receiver decodes all of them as index
l  {0,1,...,M   1}. From the equilibrium conditions 1 and 2 in section 2:
Proposition 1 A code (M,n) is a Nash Equilibrium code if and only if
i) p(y|x(i))   p(y|x(j))  i  = j   M, and d(y)=i
ii)
 
y Yi p(y|x(i))  
 
y Yi p(y|x), for all x  {0,1}
n.
The question that arises is whether Shannon’s strategies are Nash equilibrium
strategies of the extended communication game  n
 . Particularly, we rewrite condi-
tion i) above in terms of the entropy condition of the jointly typical sequences. For
any two indexes l and k, let xl = x(l), and xk = x(k), then
d(y)=l, whenever p(y|xl)   p(y|xk)  xk   M




logp(xl,y)   H(X,Y ) <  and  
1
n
logp(xk,y)   H(X,Y ) >  .
By Deﬁnition 3, set An
  is the set of jointly typical sequences. Consider y   Yn such
that (x0,y)   An
  and (x1,y) /   An
 . Formally:
 




logp(x0,y)   H(X,Y )
 
   
  <  and
 




logp(x1,y)   H(X,Y )
 
   
     
Therefore if y were decoded as l, we could assert that y is jointly typical with
xl, and not jointly typical with any other xk. It is straightforward to check that
the opposite is not true, that is, even if the empirical entropy of p(xl,y) were closer
than that of p(xk,y) to the true entropy, then the conditional probability of xl given
11y would not need be bigger than the conditional probability of xk given y. In fact
there are four possible inequalities:
1.   1
n logp(x0,y)   H(X,Y ) <  and   1
n logp(x1,y)   H(X,Y ) > . In this
case we obtain that
p(x0|y) >
2 n(H(X,Y )+ )
p(y)
>p (x1|y)
and therefore, if (x0,y) is more statistically related than (x1,y), then the conditional
probability of x0 given y will be greater than the conditional probability of x1 given
y.
2. 1
n logp(x0,y)+H(X,Y ) <  and 1
n logp(x1,y)+H(X,Y ) > . In this case
we obtain the opposite conclusion. Namely,
p(x0|y) <
2 n(H(X,Y )  )
p(y)
<p (x1|y)
and now the above condition shows that even if the empirical entropy of p(x0,y)
were closer than that of p(x1,y) to the true entropy, then the conditional probability
of x1 given y could be bigger than or equal to the conditional probability of x0 given
y.
3.   1
n logp(x0,y)   H(X,Y ) <  and 1
n logp(x1,y)+H(X,Y ) > . Here,
p(x0,y) >
2 n(H(X,Y )+ )
p(y)
and
2 n(H(X,Y )  )
p(y)
<p (x1,y).
and no relationship between p(x0|y) and p(x1|y) can be established. Finally,
4. 1
n logp(x0,y)+H(X,Y ) <  and   1
n logp(x1,y)   H(X,Y ) >  .
As the third case above, we cannot establish any order between p(x0|y) and
p(x1|y). Indeed, we get:
p(x0|y) <
2 n(H(X,Y )+ )
p(y)
and
2 n(H(X,Y )  )
p(y)
>p (x1|y).
Condition i) above establishes an order on the conditional probabilities of each
output sequences y, for all input sequences. We have seen that when the entropy
condition of the Jointly Typical Set is satisﬁed without the absolute value, then it
properly orders these conditional probabilities. Otherwise it may fail to do so.
Consider now condition ii). Let Yl be the set of y   Y such that p(y|xl)  






p(y|xk) for all xk   M.
12The second condition says that the aggregated probability of partition Yl when  S
l
was sent is higher than such probability2 when any other code, even those sequences
never taken into account in the realized codebook, are sent.
4 Examples: Shannon versus Game Theory
We wish to investigate whether the random coding and jointly typical decoding are
robust to a game theoretical analysis, i.e. whether they are ex-ante equilibrium
strategies. Since, the ex-ante equilibrium is equivalent to playing a Nash for every
code realization, then if for some code realizations the players’ strategies are not a
Nash equilibrium, then no ex-ante equilibrium will exist.
In the sequel we analyze three examples. The ﬁrst two examples correspond to
two realizations of the random coding. The former consists of the “natural” coding
in the sense that the signal strings do not share a common digit, either 0 or 1,
and then the decoding rule translates to the “majority” rule; the latter is a worse
codebook realization. For each code realization we show how to generate a partition
of the output space, the receiver’s strategy and the players’ equilibrium conditions.
In particular, we prove that receiver’s equilibrium condition is not fulﬁlled for the
second code realization. The last example o ers a sender’s deviation.
Fix a Sender-Receiver “common interest” game   where nature chooses  i, i =
0,1, according to the law q =( q0,q 1) = (0.5,0.5). The Receiver’s set of actions is




 0 (1,1) (0,0)
 1 (0,0) (1,1)
Consider the noisy channel  ( 0, 1) where the probability transition matrix
p(y|x) expressing the probability of observing the output symbol y, given that the
symbol x was sent, is p(1|0) =  0 =0 .1 and p(0|1) =  1 =0 .2.
Deﬁne the binary random variable X  which takes value 0 with probability   and
value 1 with probability 1    . Let Y  be the random variable deﬁned by the chan-
nel probabilistic transformation of the input random variable X  with probability
distribution:
Y  = {(1    0)  +  1(1    ), 0  + (1    1)(1    )}.
2Recalling that the error  l of decoding the codeword xl is  l = Pr(y    k =lYk|xl)=  
y/  Yl p(y|xl), and that the right side
 
y Yl p(y|xk) is part of the  k error, then the Sender’s
condition could be written as 1  l  
 
y Yl p(y|xk) for all xk   M, which means that the aggre-
gated probability of the partition Yl when  
S
l was sent is higher than the corresponding part of the
k-error of any code even for sequences never taken into account in the realized codebook.
13Therefore the mutual information between X  and Y  is equal to:
I(X ;Y )=H(Y )   H(Y |X )=
H({(1    0)  +  1(1    ), 0  + (1    1)(1    )})   [ H( 0) + (1    )H( 1)].
Let     = argmax  I(X ,Y  ). Then for channel  ( 0, 1)= (0.1,0.2), this proba-
bility     =0 .52.
Random codes are generated, for each state of nature, according to the probabil-
ity distribution     =0 .52. The code corresponding to index 0, i.e. state  0, say x0, is
generated by n independent realizations of    . Similarly, x1 is the code corresponding
to index 1, i.e. state  1. Let us consider that a code is chosen uniformly at random
and sent through the noisy channel (by sending n bits one after the other).
4.1 A code fulﬁlling the Nash equilibrium conditions
We present ﬁrst the realization of the “natural code” in full detail because it is quite
familiar and will help the reader to follow later a more complicated example. To
make the analysis very simple consider that the communication goes for 3 periods
and let  3
  be the noisy communication extended game.










Nature informs the sender about the true state of nature, therefore, the sender’s
strategy  S
j , j =0 ,1 is sending:
 S
0 = x0 = 000, if   =  0
 S
1 = x1 = 111, if   =  1
The receiver observes a transformed sequence y, with transition probability
p(y|x)=
 3
i=1 p(yi|xi) and tries to guess which message has been sent. He will
consider that index j was sent if (xj,y) are jointly typical and there is no other
index k, such that (xk,y) are jointly typical. If no such index j exists, then an error
will be declared.
Let us proceed to construct the receiver’s strategy, by generating a partition of
the set of outcome sequences Y = {0,1}3. To apply the jointly typical decoding








  H(X,Y )|
3Notice that only the third condition in the deﬁnition of jointly typical sequences is the binding
condition to be checked.
14which measures the di erence between the empirical entropy of each sequence in Y
and the true entropy H(X,Y ) = 1,6.
For example, for y = 000, for our speciﬁc channel  (0.1, 0.2) and since     =0 .5,
then p(y = 000|x0 = 000) = (p(0|0))3 = (1    0)3 =0 .93 =0 .59; p(y = 000|x1 =
111) = (p(0|1))3 =  3
1 =0 .23 =0 .0003; p(x0,y)=p(y|x0)p(x0) = 0.59   (0.5)3, and
p(x1,y)=p(y|x1)p(x1) = 0.0003   (0.33), and then:
 x0(y =000) = 0.485 and  x1(y =000) = 1.801
Now we have to choose an  -approximation in order to partition the output mes-
sage space. Fix   =0 .64. The reason for such a choice will become clear at the end
of the example. Recall that such value is the upper bound of the distance between
the empirical entropy and the true entropy to deﬁne jointly typical sequences. Then,
the jointly typical decoding rule states that a given y   Y is jointly typical with
x0 = 000, and with x1 = 111, respectively, whenever
 x0(y) <  =0 .64
 x1(y) <  =0 .64, respectively
The jointly typical decoding rule allows the receiver to deﬁne the following sub-
sets of Y,
P0
0 = {y   Y : x0(y) < }
P¬0
0 = {y   Y : x0(y)    }
P¬1
1 = {y   Y : x1(y)    }
P1
1 = {y   Y : x1(y) < }
The ﬁrst set P0
0 contains all the sequences in Y that are probabilistically related
to input sequence x0 = 000. Conversely, set P¬0
0 refers to all the sequences of Y
that are not probabilistically related to x0. Similarly, P1
1 is the set of sequences in
Y that are probabilistically related to input sequence x1 = 111, while P¬1
1 is the











0   P¬1
1 = {y   Y : x0(y) <  and  x1(y)    }
P1 = P¬0
0   P1
1 = {y   Y : x1(y) <  and  x0(y)    }.
15the set of all sequences of Y which are uniquely related in probability to x0 and x1,
respectively. Since, P0
0 = P¬1
1 this implies that no matters whether x0 or x1 has





1 implies that the receiver decodes all the sequences in either of these sets
as corresponding to x1. Moreover, since P0   P1 =   and P0   P1 = Y, then the
typical decoding rule generates a true partition. In fact, the jointly typical decoding
rule is in this case equivalent to the majority rule decoding. To see this let yk be





(1    0)k 3 k
0
(1    0)k 3 k
0 +  k
1(1    1)3 k  
1
2
if and only if k   2.
The jointly typical decoding rule gives rise to the receiver’s strategy, for each
y   Y:
 R
y = ai, whenever y   Pi
To show that the above strategies are a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, let
us check that both the sender and the receiver’s strategies are a best response to
each other.
1) The receiver’s Nash equilibrium condition translates to her choice of action
a0 whenever p(y| S
0 )   p(y| S
1 ), and of action a1 otherwise. In table 1 below it
can be checked that all output sequences y, that satisfy with strict inequality the
condition p(y| S
0 )   p(y| S
1 ) are exactly those belonging to set P0, and those for
which p(y| S
1 )   p(y| S
0 ) with strict inequality are the ones in P1. Therefore the
receiver’s jointly typical decoding rule is a best response to the sender’s coding
strategy.
y p(y|x0) p(y|x1) y
000 0.729 0.008 000
001 0.081 0.032 001
010 0.081 0.032 010
011 0.009 0.128 011
100 0.081 0.032 100
101 0.009 0.128 101
110 0.009 0.128 110
111 0.001 0.512 111
Table 1
2) The sender’s Nash equilibrium condition, given the receiver’s jointly typical
decoding, amounts to choosing input sequences  S
0 and  S






































for any other input sequences   S




y P0 p(y|x0) and
 
y P1 p(y|x1) denote the aggregated probabilities of
the sequences in P0 and P1 when input sequences x0 and x1 are sent. Given the





y P1 p(y|x1) x1
000 0.972 0.028 000
001 0.846 0.154 001
011 0.328 0.672 011
111 0.104 0.896 111
Table 2
Clearly, if the state is  0, then obeying the communication protocol and sending
 S
0 = 000 will be a best reply to the receiver’s strategy, since sending instead any
other input sequence will only decrease the sender’s payo s, as shown in the left
hand side of the above table. Similarly, if the state is  1, sending  S
1 = 111 will
maximize the sender’s payo s against the receiver’s strategy, as shown in the right
hand side of the above table.
To conclude this example we display in Figure 1 the relationship between the
 -approximation and the existence of an output set partition. The horizontal axes
represents the output set sequences and the vertical axes are the functions  x0(y)
(the dotted line) and  x1(y) (the continuos line) for the natural coding x0 = 000
and x1 = 111. Di erent values of   have been plotted in the same Figure 1. We
obtain the following remarks:
• For an   =0 .9 and y   Y, if the value of  x0(y) goes by above of the constant
function   =0 .9, then that of  x1(y) will go by below of  , and the same will
happen in the other way around. By the Jointly Typical condition every y
is uniquely related in probability to either x0 or x1. Therefore for   =0 .9a
partition of set Y is easily generated.
• The same reasoning applies to any   in (0.6,1.08). This is why we have chosen
  =0 .64.
17• For     1.08 or     0.6, there are output sequences belonging to both the
output set associated to x0 and that associated to x1. Hence, there is a need
to uniquely reassign those sequences to one of the them.
In sum, under the natural coding x0 = 000 and x1 = 111 it is possible to
ﬁnd a range of   which enables to construct a partition of the output set
and therefore support the strategies of the communication protocol as a Nash
equilibrium of the extended communication game.
  =0 .64
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Figure 1: Partition of the output message space around x0 = 000, x1 = 111.
However, other realizations of the random code might not guarantee the existence
of such an   to construct such partition as the following code realization shows.
4.2 A receiver’s deviation










where, as above, the channel is  ( 0, 1)= (0.1,0.2) and  3
  is the noisy communi-
cation extended game. Fix now   =0 .37.
18Let us consider that the receiver observes the output sequence y = 010. Let us









  H(X,Y)| =0 .36
For   =0 .37, Shannon protocol dictates that the receiver decodes y as x1 and
plays action a1. This situation would correspond with case 3 in subsection 3.1
where the protocol may not order the conditional probabilities. In fact, the Nash
equilibrium condition for the receiver when y = 010 translates to choosing action
a0 since, as shown above, the conditional probability of y given x0 = 010 (0.648) is
bigger than the conditional probability of y given x1 = 011 (0.144).
4.3 A sender’s deviation
Fix now4 n = 5 and suppose that the speciﬁc and common knowledge realization of
the random code is the following:
 














where the two signal strings share the ﬁrst three digits, and therefore only the last
two digits are di erent.
Then  S
j , j =0 ,1 is:
 S
0 = x0 = 00000, if   =  0
 S
1 = x1 = 00011, if   =  1





1, P0 and P1 of Y.
Notice that P0
0  = P¬1
1 implies that the receiver cannot univocally assign some y
in Y to x0 no matter whether x0 or x1 has been sent. Similarly, P¬0
0  = P1
1 with the
same meaning for x1. Therefore, P0 P1   Y. Let us deﬁne the set P2 = Y P0 P1:
P2 = {y   Y : x0(y) <  and  x1(y) < }   {y   Y : x1(y)     and  x0(y)    }
= {00100,00111,01000,01011,01100,01111,10000,10011,10100,10111,11000,11011}.
This set contains all the sequences in Y, which the receiver is not able to decode,
i.e., any y   P2 cannot be univocally assigned either to x0 or x1: the errors in
4We run a systematic search computation for a sender’s deviation when n<5 and we concluded
that there was none.
19Shannon’s approach. Therefore, the jointly typical decoding does not generate a
partition of Y, and the receiver does not know how to take an action in  .
There is a need then to assign the sequences in P2 to either P0 or P1. Consider
that the speciﬁc rule is to assign each sequences y   P2, to that element of the input
sequence which is probabilistically closer to them5, namely






Therefore, P0   P1 =   and P0   P1 = Y, and the partition gives rise to the
receiver’s strategy  R
y = ai, whenever y   Pi, and for each y   Y.
Recalling that p(P0)=
 
y P0 p(y| S
0 ) and p(P1)=
 
y P1 p(y| S
1 ), then it is
easy to calculate that p(P0) = 0.729 and p(P1) = 0.271.
Consider the sender’ deviation, i.e.,
 dS
0 = xd
0 = 11100, if   =  0, instead of  S
0 = x0 = 00000
 1 = x1 = 00011, if   =  1
This deviation does not change the partition but does change the probability
associated to sets P0 and P1. In particular,
 
y P1 p(y|x0 = 00000) = 0.21951 and
 
y P1 p(y|xd
0 = 00011) = 0.98916.
Suppose that   =  0 and let  S
0 and  R
y be the strategies of following faithfully
the protocol in  5
 , for each y   Y. Then, the sender’s expected payo s are
 S











0 )1 = 0.21951
 dS











0 )1 = 0.80352
and the sender will then deviate.
5This rule is in the spirit of the maximum likelihood criterion.
205 Concluding remarks
Information Theory tells us that whatever the probability of error in information
transmission, it is possible to construct error-correcting codes in which the likelihood
of failure is arbitrarily low. In this framework, error detection is the ability to
detect the presence of errors caused by noise, while error correction is the additional
ability to reconstruct the original error-free data. Detection is much simpler than
correction, and the basic idea is to add one or more “check” digits to the transmitted
information (e.g., some digits are commonly embedded in credit card numbers in
order to detect mistakes). As is common in Information Theory protocols, both the
sender and the receiver are committed to use speciﬁc rules in order to construct
error correcting/detecting codes.
Shannon’s theorem is an important theorem in error correction which describes
the maximum attainable e ciency of an error-correcting scheme for expected lev-
els of noise interference. Namely, Shannon’s Theorem is an asymptotic result and
establishes that for all small tolerance it is possible to construct error-correcting
codes in which the likelihood of failure is arbitrarily low, thus providing necessary
and su cient conditions to achieve a good information transmission. Nevertheless,
the asymptotic nature of such a protocol masks the di culties to apply information
theory protocols to ﬁnite communication schemes in strategic sender-receiver games.
In this paper we consider a game-theoretical model where a sender and a receiver
are players trying to coordinate their actions through a ﬁnite time communication
protocol ` a la Shannon. Firstly, given a common knowledge coding rule and an output
message, we o er the Nash equilibrium condition for the extended communication
game. Speciﬁcally, the receiver’s equilibrium conditions are summarized by choosing
the action corresponding to that state of nature for which the conditional probabil-
ity of the received message is higher. This implies an ordering of the probability of
receiving a message conditional to any possible input message. On the other hand,
given the realized state of nature and the receiver’s partition of the output message
space generated by the coding and the decoding rules, the sender’s equilibrium con-
ditions are speciﬁed by choosing the input message maximizing the sum of the above
conditional probabilities over all output messages belonging to the partition corre-
sponding to that state of nature. Secondly, we relate the Nash equilibrium strategies
to those of Shannon’s coding and decoding scheme. Particularly, we rewrite the re-
ceiver’s Nash constraint in terms of the entropy condition of the Jointly Typical
Set, pointing out that such entropy condition may not be enough to guarantee the
partition of the output space. Finally, we provide two counterexamples to illustrate
our ﬁndings.
Consequently, coding and decoding rules under Information Theory satisfy a set
of information transmission constraints, but they may fail to be Nash equilibrium
21strategies.
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